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meeting with French leader Jacques Chirac and German leader Gerhard Schroeder
in September, Putin stated Russia s opposition to an  expansion of the club of
nuclear powers, notably through the addition of Iran. 96 Then in commenting on the
tough September IAEA resolution, Rumyantsev stated,  It is balanced and serves
the interests of all parties. 97
While Russia proved supportive of the EU3 negotiations with Iran, it reportedly
opposed Iranian efforts to get the 20 centrifuges excluded from the agreement,
140 R.O. Freedman
something that was negatively commented on by the Iranian news agency Mehr.98
Putin himself, as the final negotiations with the EU3 wound down, made a not-
so-veiled warning to Iran, stating,  We are engaged in bilateral negotiations with
Iran. We are helping it use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. If final agreements
are achieved, we will continue this cooperation. 99 Then, when the agreement
was reached at the end of November, and the subsequent IAEA report took a
relatively tough stand against Iran, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak told
Interfax that not only did Russia praise the IAEA resolution as  well balanced,
but  we also welcome Iran s decision to freeze all uranium enrichment programs.
This is a voluntary, trust building measure. We hope this decision will be reliably
fulfilled. 100 The Russian Foreign Ministry, in a statement issued after the IAEA
resolution, reinforced Kislyak s words, noting  a full and sustained fulfillment of
this voluntary undertaking, with due monitoring on the part of the IAEA is essential
for the settlement of remaining issues regarding Iran s nuclear program. 101
Moscow s sharp rhetoric vis-à-vis Tehran began to fade in 2005. As mentioned
above, in the latter part of 2004 Putin had suffered a number of embarrassing
failures both internally and externally with the debacle in Beslan demonstrating
just how far Putin was from  normalizing the situation in Chechnya, and the pro-
Western Orange Revolution in the Ukraine apparently indicating the defection of
Russia s most important CIS neighbor. Consequently, Putin seems to have decided
that he had to demonstrate both his own, and Russia s, continuing importance in
world affairs, and reinforcing his alliance with Iran was one way to do this.102
The process included inviting Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
as an observer, and also inviting Iran to join the planned Caspian Sea security
organization. (Iran, under heavy pressure both from the United States and the
European Union, eagerly accepted both invitations.) The two countries also stepped
up their planning for a north south transportation corridor through Azerbaijan. In
addition, Moscow launched a satellite for Iran and discussed the possibility of the
sale of submarine-launched missiles with a range of 300 kilometers to be fitted
on the submarines Russia had sold to Iran.103 Should the sale go through, it would
greatly complicate the activities of the US fleet in the Persian Gulf Indian Ocean
region, and be a major blow to US Russian relations.
While all these developments demonstrated a reinforced tie between Russia and
Iran, the nuclear issue continued to occupy first place in the relationship. In early
2005, however, Iran was becoming increasingly critical of the delay in Russia s
finalizing completion of the reactor. Indeed, a Kehyan commentary by Mehdi
Mohammadi in early January 2005 went so far as to assert that  the breaches of
promise, subterfuge and mischief-making of the Russians in the field of peaceful
nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now a repeated saga. 104
Whether or not the Iranian criticism was an important factor in Putin s decision
making is not yet known. However, Putin did realize that in order to cement the
relationship with Iran, which he saw as a foreign policy priority, for reasons
mentioned above, he had to finalize the nuclear fuel agreement. Consequently in
late February 2005, Russia signed the final agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel
to the Bushehr reactor.105 Under the agreement all spent fuel was to be returned to
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 141
Russia, thus, in theory at least, preventing its diversion into atomic weapons. The
agreement came after a Bush Putin summit in which the US and Russia pledged
to work together against nuclear proliferation,106 and, as might be expected, the US
took a dim view of the Russian Iranian agreement.
Perhaps emboldened by the agreement with Russia, Iran s then chief nuclear
negotiator, Hassan Rowhani warned that Iran would never permanently cease
enriching uranium, and if the US sought sanctions at the UN Security Council,
 The security and stability of the region would become a problem. Rowhani also
stated that Iran was not happy with the pace of negotiations with the EU3, and
threatened to end the negotiations if there were no progress.107
Meanwhile, as the US became increasingly bogged down in Iraq, it appeared to
somewhat back off from its confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue. Thus
in mid-March 2005 the US agreed to join the EU in offering economic incentives
to Iran if it gave up its nuclear program.108 At the same time, however, an Iranian
presidential campaign was now underway. While both the US and the EU3 hoped
that the victor would be former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom they
felt they could make a deal with, to their surprise an Islamic hardliner, Mahmud
Ahmadinezhad, the Mayor of Tehran was elected president. Consequently when
the EU3 presented its proposal to Ahmadinezhad s government on 5 August 2005,
it was contemptuously rejected as a  joke. 109 The proposal called for a long-
term EU Iranian relationship which combined security and economic incentives,
including giving Iran access to international technologies for light water reactors,
in return for Iran agreeing not to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
and keeping all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.110 The Iranian
rejection may have been encouraged by a leaked US intelligence report in the
Washington Post on 2 August 2005 which asserted the Iran was five to ten years
away from acquiring a nuclear weapon.111 The Iranians may well have seen the leak
as an effort by the Bush Administration to deflect public pressure to take action
against Iran by demonstrating that Iran would not have the bomb for a decade. In
any case an emboldened Iran, led by its hardline president who appeared to have
the support of Iran s supreme religious leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, not only
rejected the EU proposal but also announced it was resuming work at the uranium
conversion plant at Isfahan, where it would transform uranium into nuclear fuel.112
An angered EU3 then cancelled further talks with Iran, and the issue was referred
to the IAEA.113
As these events were transpiring, Russia sought to defuse the crisis, with the
Russian Foreign Ministry issuing a statement of 9 August 2005 which asserted that
 it would be a wise decision on the part of Iran to stop enriching uranium and renew
cooperation with the IAEA. 114 Iran did not heed the Russian request, however,
and international pressure on Iran grew at the end of August with French president
Jacques Chirac warning that Iran would face censure by the UN Security Council if
it did not reinstate a freeze on sensitive nuclear activities.115 Russia, however, was
now in a protective mode vis-à-vis Iran and chose not to go beyond its verbal call
for Iran to stop enriching uranium. Thus on 5 September 2005 the Russian Foreign
Ministry stated it was opposed to reporting Iran to the UN Security Council.116 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]